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Abstract  
In the midst of a serious macroeconomic crisis Argentina implemented a large 
social program – the Programa Jefes de Hogar (PJH) – that provides cash transfers 
to unemployed household heads meeting certain criteria. In practice, giving the 
difficulties in monitoring informal jobs, the unemployment requirement of the PJH 
would imply a disincentive for the program participants to search for a formal job. 
By applying matching techniques we evaluate the empirical relevance of this 
prediction during the period of strong economic growth that followed the crisis. 
We find some evidence on the informality bias of the PJH when the value of the 
transfer was relatively high compared to wages in the formal labor market.   
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 1. Introduction 
In the midst of one of the most serious economic crisis of its history Argentina 
implemented a large poverty-alleviation program, named Programa Jefes de Hogar 
(henceforth, PJH). This program combines features of a workfare and a conditional cash 
transfer program. The PJH was aimed at providing cash transfers to those unemployed 
household heads with children at school. The belief that poverty was closely related to 
unemployment led to include the unemployment requirement as a targeting device.  
The conditioning on unemployment implies in theory a full taxation on incomes for the 
program participants: getting a job means the loss of the program benefits. However, in 
practice the monitoring of the program requirements is not perfect, and hence a worker 
may manage to hold a job and the PJH benefits at the same time. The probability of 
being in this situation is highly dependent on the visibility of the job. In particular, 
formal jobs that provide social security benefits are included in administrative records, 
so they are difficult to hold along with PJH benefits. Therefore, the unemployment 
requirement of the PJH would imply a disincentive for beneficiaries to search for a 
formal job.  
In practice, however, the informality bias of the program might be negligible. The 
monitoring of the program may be so weak that participants may not fear losing the 
transfer by accepting a formal job. It could also be the case that the supply of formal 
jobs for the typical beneficiary of the PJH is so low that the informality effect of the 
program is insignificant, or that in a segmented market framework, wages and labor 
benefits in the formal sector are so high that all workers would accept an offer from a 
formal job even when having to resign the program cash transfer.  
In this paper we apply non-experimental matching techniques to assess the impact of the 
PJH on labor informality during a period of strong economic growth. Between 2002 and 
2005 the Argentine economy grew at an annual 8% rate, driving both employment and 
formal employment up. We investigate whether PJH participants were more reluctant to 
accept formal jobs in this booming economy than their non-participants counterparts. 
To that aim we take advantage of the short panel structure of the Argentine household 
survey.  
We find some evidence on the informality bias of the PJH in the period when the value 
of the transfer was relatively high compared to wages in the formal labor market. The 
effect of the distortion vanished when earnings in registered jobs went substantially up. 
The results, however, are not robust to all the specifications, and then call for further 
research.   
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we briefly describe the main 
characteristics of the Programa Jefes de Hogar, while in section 3 we discuss the 
theoretical predictions about the effects of the program on employment and labor 
informality. Section 4 is aimed at presenting the basic data and some preliminary 
evidence. The main results of the paper are shown and discussed in section 5. We end in 
section 6 with some concluding remarks.  
 
2. The Programa Jefes de Hogar  
Argentina fell into a severe economic and social crisis at the end of 2001. The 
resignation of President de la Rua was followed by the collapse of the Convertibility 
Plan (pegging the Argentine peso to the dollar), the subsequent devaluation and the 
default on the external debt. The economy entered a phase of severe contraction. 
Unemployment rate rose sharply from 16% in May 2001 to 21% in May 2002. The 
proportion of people living below the official poverty line reached 38.4% by October 
2001 and jumped to 57.5% one year after.1 In this scenario the Programa Jefes de Hogar 
was implemented in the first half of 2002, as an emergency response to the economic 
and social unrest.2  
The PJH quickly became the largest poverty-alleviation program in Argentina ever. In 
the second half of 2002 the program had 2 million beneficiaries, representing 10% of 
the adult population (aged 18 to 65) in Argentina. The cash transfers of the PJH reached 
around 15% of all households in the country. In certain regions the share was as high as 
40% (e.g. Formosa and Chaco). The number of beneficiaries has been decreasing since 
2003 due to more strict administrative controls, and the recovery of the labor market. 
Yet, the program remains large: the number of participants is still around 1.5 million. 
The size of the program is also large when compared to international standards. For 
instance, although the famous Progresa/Oportunidades in Mexico has around 1.6 times 
more beneficiaries, the Mexican population is 2.8 times greater than the Argentina’s 
population.  
The PJH is a poverty-alleviation conditional cash transfer program. The main benefit is 
a cash transfer of 150 pesos per month to each eligible individual. The level of the cash 
transfer was established below the average market wage for full-time unskilled workers 
to encourage people to seek for a genuine job. According to the program rules, the PJH 
should provide aid only to unemployed household heads with dependents under 18 who 
                                                 
1 Own estimates using the official moderate poverty line. See CEDLAS (2006).  
2 The program was formally created by the Decreto 565/2002 in April, 2002. 
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are enrolled in school (or any age who are disabled). The program is also available to 
spouses or partners who are pregnant.  
The conditionality of the transfer is based on two characteristics that are difficult to 
define and monitor: being head of the household, and being unemployed. In particular, 
verifying unemployment is problematic in an economy where more than half of the 
employment is in the informal sector. All what the government can do at a reasonable 
cost is checking whether a PJH participant has a formal registered job, and denying the 
benefits if so. In fact, after the program was launched the government started to cross 
information of the participants with the national register of formal jobs (SIJP), the 
unemployment insurance, and other small social programs. Workers holding a formal 
job recorded in the SIJP system were eventually deleted from the PJH list. For the most 
part, the unemployment requirement became a requisite for not having a formal 
registered job.  
The requirement of being the head of the household to apply for the program is also 
ambiguous and difficult to monitor. In practice it became a restriction to avoid that both  
the actual head of the household and her/his spouse apply to the program at the same 
time. More than half of the PJH participants are not household heads, according to what 
they report to the national household survey (EPH).  
In addition, the PJH requires the individual to carry out counterpart work in order to 
receive the cash transfer. Participants have to do 20 hours of basic community work, 
training activities, school attendance or employment in a private company with a wage 
subsidy for six months. The municipalities (together with local NGOs) are in charge of 
organizing the work activities. Provincial offices of the Ministry of Labor, together with 
municipal and provincial councils are responsible for monitoring the work activities 
under the PJH, while federal government provides the funds. Some studies and plenty of 
anecdotal evidence reveal the unclearness of how strictly the work requirements are 
enforced. The work condition is difficult to prove, given the weak capacity to organize, 
supervise and enforce this requirement at the local level. The assessment of Ministerio 
de Trabajo (2004) is more positive: according to a survey to participants, 80% of the 
respondents were engaged in a work activity required by the program; most of them in 
community projects (60%) and in administrative activities in municipalities (20%).  
Although the program was promoted as a social right available to everyone complying 
with the requirements, the limited funds forced the authorities to apply some rationing 
mechanism from the beginning. The Program was officially launched in April 2002, 
while the application process closed on June 20, 2002. In theory no additional 
applications were accepted after that deadline, even when the applicant met the program 
conditions. Applying to the PJH was very simple, and the program was promoted by the 
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national media. However, the time period was brief for being aware of the program, 
understanding its characteristics and applying in the local centers. In fact, although 
people could apply personally, most applications were made by social organizations that 
acted quickly. In most cases people were assigned the program on a first-come-first-
served basis. Some of those who applied later, even before the deadline, were rationed 
out of the program.  
 
3. Labor incentives  
The structure of the PJH implies a potential distortion on the supply for labor. The 
program is aimed at unemployed individuals. According to the law, a person who works 
in the labor market is not entitled to the program even when the job is sporadic, or the 
wage rate is so low that the worker is considered poor. The program requires 
participants to work a certain number of hours in community works, which turns the 
PJH into a workfare program.   
Figure 3.1 depicts the consumption (C)-leisure (L) choice of an eligible person 
(household head with children attending school) who initially faces a wage rate w1 equal 
to the slope of the line IJ, and is endowed with a non-labor income I. The kinked budget 
constraint is TIJ. The Programa Jefes de Hogar provides a cash transfer to all 
unemployed persons. Without any requirement to get the subsidy, the budget constraint 
would now include point P. However, participants are supposed to comply with the 
work requirement. For simplicity, we model that requirement as a reduction in the time 
available for leisure or for working in the market. If the time needed to comply with the 
requirement is the distance BP, then the new available point is B instead of P. The new 
budget constraint is then the original one before the program (TIJ) plus point B.  
 
Figure 3.1 
Labor incentives of the Programa Jefes de Hogar  
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Notice that the structure of the program in theory implies full disincentives to work. If a 
program participant located at B decides to work one hour, s(he) would  lose the whole 
transfer and go to a point in the initial budget constraint close to I, which would be very 
likely worse than staying at B.3
 The individual will abandon the program when the wage goes up to w2 and the budget 
constraint shifts to TIF. Notice that there is a period when the economy recovers and the 
real wage grows from w1 to w2, in which there are jobs in the market, wages are 
increasing, but program participants prefer to stay in the program.  
Anecdotal evidence points to the fact that many participants do not comply with the 
work requirement. In that case the program adds point P (not B) to the budget 
constraint, and the negative effects on the labor supply are even larger. Figure 3.1 shows 
that while an individual is indifferent between working in the market at a wage rate w2 
(point D) and accepting a program with work requirement (point B), s(he) would prefer 
the program without work requirements (point P) than a job in the labor market. Notice 
that the individual depicted in figure 3.1 can earn in the market more than the PJH 
transfer, but s(he) still prefers to participate in the program since point P is on a higher 
indifference curve than point D.   
Although in theory the program is intended only for the unemployed (the program is 
commonly known as Program for Unemployed Household Heads), in practice the 
unemployment condition is difficult to monitor. Administrative weakness precludes the 
government to check the unemployment condition for people who carry out informal 
activities or hold informal salaried jobs. In addition, as the program was mainly 
intended to alleviate poverty, not unemployment, many local officials in charge of 
administering the program find difficult to deny the transfer to a poor family, even when 
knowing that the head has some labor activity.  
For the reasons mentioned above, in practice the unemployment requirement is replaced 
by an implicit structure in which the probability of losing the program is much higher 
for workers in the formal registered sector, than for the unemployed/inactive and those 
working in the hidden economy. If the individual has a registered job with social 
security rights it is relatively easy for authorities to detect the fraud and to deny the 
program. According to information from the national household survey, in 2003 only 19 
out of 2,678 PJH participants worked in the formal sector. 
Suppose a situation of economic crisis with high unemployment. The individual 
depicted in Figure 3.2 faces a zero wage rate and then s(he) is initially at point I. 
                                                 
3 The choice depends on the indifference map: individuals with strong preferences for leisure may prefer 
a point on the original budget line close to I than point B. 
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Assuming no work requirement, the program allows that individual to go to point P. 
Trivially, there is not distortion in this case, due to the lack of labor market 
opportunities. Assume now that the economy recovers, and that in a segmented market 
framework, the individual has the opportunity to work in a formal job at hourly wage wF 
or in an informal activity at hourly wage wI. In principle the formal job is better, but it 
has a caveat: while the participant can keep the PJH while working in the informal 
sector, s(he) has to quit the program if chooses the formal job. The budget constraint in 
the former case is TPM, while it becomes TIF if s(he) chooses a registered employment. 
Many individuals will find optimal to choose a point in the segment DP, i.e. to choose 
to stay in the program and work in the informal sector, even when having an offer for a 
formal job at a higher wage rate.4 Of course, as the formal earnings grow relative to the 
program transfer and the informal wage, the individual will eventually quit the program.  
 
Figure 3.2 
Informal work  incentives of the Programa Jefes de Hogar  
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Although the worker may prefer to refuse an offer for a formal job if the wage rate is 
not sufficiently high, local authorities may push him (her) to accept it, if by doing that 
they could have an additional slot available for a new PJH beneficiary. In practice, 
however, federal authorities did not easily allow new participants into the program. The 
policy was to progressively reduce the PJH, as the labor market recovered and original 
participants left the program. In that scenario, and given that the program was nationally 
funded, local governments had low incentives in promoting people to find formal jobs 
and quit the program.  
There are some reasons why the disincentive to formal jobs may not operate in the real 
world. A trivial one is low enforcement capacity: authorities might not want or be able 
to find and punish beneficiaries working in the formal sector. However, as documented 
                                                 
4 The bias toward labor informality may extend to other members of the household. The PJH is mostly 
held by women. If the female participant’s husband is offered a formal registered job, he should take into 
account the increase in the probability of losing the PJH benefits, and might prefer to reject the offer. 
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above, estimates from the EPH do not support this possibility: most workers are quickly 
deleted from the program as they find a formal registered job.   
A second possibility arises in a segmented labor market where the wage distance 
(including social benefits) between a formal and an informal job is larger than the cash 
transfer of the program. In that case, there might be no individuals in the “margin”. 
Faced to the opportunity of a formal position, a PJH participant has no doubt in 
accepting it, even when that implies quitting the program. Formal jobs are better than 
informal jobs, and any worker, either having to resign the benefits of the poverty-
alleviation program or not, prefers the formal employment. In that case, trivially, the 
program does not imply any additional distortion on the workers’ choices.  
A third possibility is that the program participants have certain characteristics that make 
them less demanded in the formal labor market. Most program participants are unskilled 
and many of them are young and women. Even when the economy starts to grow and 
the economic perspectives are good, firms may be reluctant to offer a formal contract to 
newly-hired unskilled young female workers. If that is the case, the program might have 
a theoretical bias toward labor informality, but in practice it could be quantitatively 
negligible.  
A fourth related case pictures program participants with preferences biased against 
formal jobs, given that this kind of jobs usually requires certain commitments (hours of 
work, place of work, schedules) that are too costly for some people. Women in charge 
of raising children may participate in the PJH, since they may find easy to negotiate a 
more flexible work requirement, or to avoid it altogether. In contrast, they may refuse a 
formal job with more strict work conditions. Hence, in practice the informality bias may 
be quantitatively very small, since many PJH participants may not look hard for formal 
jobs.    
In summary, as the economy recovers program participants may be more reluctant to 
accept formal jobs than non-participants with the same characteristics. The PJH implies 
in theory an informality bias that, however, for many reasons may not be quantitatively 
relevant in practice. The rest of the paper is aimed at providing evidence on that issue. 
 
4. Data and preliminary evidence  
The national household survey in Argentina (Encuesta Permanente de Hogares, EPH) 
has information on labor variables, and identifies the beneficiaries of the Programa Jefes 
de Hogar. The EPH is carried out by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos 
(INDEC) since the early 1970s in the Greater Buenos Aires area, and since the 1980s in 
most large cities (more than 100,000 inhabitants). During 2003 a major methodological 
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change was implemented by INDEC, including changes in the questionnaires and in the 
timing of the survey visits. The new survey (know as EPH Continua, or EPHC) is now 
conducted over the whole year. The modifications of the questionnaire in the labor 
section were particularly important, and led to substantial jumps in the series of all 
employment variables. For instance, Gasparini (2006) reports that the share of salaried 
workers in informal jobs (defined as absence of social security rights) is 0.388 when 
using the May 2003 EPH, and 0.437 when using the EPHC for the second half of 2003.5   
The PJH started in 2002 and questions on that program showed up in the EPH of that 
year. Given the changes in the survey commented above we decided to work only with 
the EPHC starting in the second half of 2003. In addition 2003 is also the year when the 
economic recovery began in Argentina after four years of stagnation and recession. The 
EPHC covers 28 large urban areas which are home to around 70% of the Argentine 
urban population. Since the share of urban areas in Argentina is 87%, the sample of the 
EPHC represents around 60% of the total population of the country.  
The EPHC is a rotating panel: individuals are interviewed in two consecutive rounds 
(quarters), left for two rounds, and surveyed again in the next two quarters. These short 
panels are used to assess changes in the labor status of individuals. We work with the 
datasets containing information for each half of the year. Some individuals are 
interviewed twice in each half. To avoid overweighting of these individuals, we ignore 
the second observation in our panels.  
As discussed above, the PJH is a large program. In 2003 12% of the households 
surveyed by the EPHC reported being beneficiaries of the program (table 4.1). That 
share has been descending over time as the labor market recovered. The relevance of the 
program in the lowest quintiles of the income distribution is high, although the PJH is 
far from being universal. In the second half of 2005 30% of the households in the 
poorest quintile received transfers from the PJH. That share falls to 17% in the second 
quintile and to 6% in the third. The program is almost inexistent in households of the 
top quintile, or households in which the head has high (tertiary) education.  
The Programa Jefes has been reasonably targeted to the poor population. Table 4.2 
shows that around 80% of the participants belong to the two bottom income quintiles of 
the population. The degree of targeting in the poorest 20% of the population has been 
increasing over time.  
Table 4.3 stresses the fact that the number of program participants has been falling since 
2003 as the labor market recovered. The share of PJH participants in the adult 
population fell from 6.2% in 2003 to 4.9% in 2005. Participants complying with the 
                                                 
5 The EPHC of the first half of 2003 is not available.  
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labor requirement are officially counted as employed. The share of “employed” PJH 
participants in total employment fell from 8.7% to 5.8% in two years. The second panel 
restricts the sample to adults in the six poorest deciles of the household income 
distribution without any tertiary education (complete or incomplete). As expected, the 
level of participation in the PJH is higher in this group. The program is substantially 
more extended among women.  
This paper is aimed at exploring the potential effect of the program on labor informality. 
There are at least two different concepts that are referred by the term labor informality. 
The “productive” definition pictures informal workers as those in low-productivity, 
unskilled, marginal jobs, while the “legalistic” or “social protection” definition stresses 
the lack of labor protection and social security benefits. The productive definition is 
concerned with the type of job (e.g. salaried vs. self-employed, large vs. small firms), 
while the social-protection/legalistic definition is concern with the compliance of the 
labor relationship with some rules, mainly labor protection. 
In this paper we deal with the latter definition of informality. By the fact of being 
registered, holding a formal job (in the legalistic sense) may reduce the probability of 
keeping the cash-transfer program. Given the information available in the EPHC we 
define a formal job as one in which the employee reports having the right to a pension 
(jubilación) when retired. Unfortunately, the relevant question is only asked to salaried 
workers. Given that the tax and social security system in Argentina is poorly-developed 
for the self-employed, in particular for the typical beneficiary of the PJH, we assume 
that all self-employed workers are informal.  
In summary, we include as formal those salaried workers that report having the right to 
pensions when retired. Salaried workers with no right to pensions, the self-employed 
and family workers with no earnings are considered informal workers. We exclude the 
group of entrepreneurs (patrones) from the analysis. We also restrict the sample to 
people aged 18 to 60, in deciles 1 to 6, and without tertiary education.   
In the period 2003-2005, as the economy recovered from a long recession, the 
unemployment rate substantially fell, fueled by a sizeable increase in formal 
employment, and an increase in inactivity (Table 4.4). While in 2003 12.9% of people 
in the sample had a formal job, that share grew to 14.2% in 2004, and 15.5% in 2005. 
The share of people in informal jobs remained roughly unchanged.  
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In order to keep the PJH, the worker in principle should not accept a formal job. Table 
4.4 shows that the great majority of PJH participants are informal workers.6  
As discussed above, while the law establishes a set of conditions to apply to the PJH, in 
practice some of them are not enforced by the authorities. Table 4.5 classifies adults 
according to four conditions: (i) being head of the household, (ii) having children under 
18, (iii) being unemployed, and (iv) having a formal job. The column labeled “qualifies 
1” identifies people who qualify to the PJH according to the law (unemployed 
household heads with children), while the next column marks those that qualify 
according to a looser criterion (adults with children without a formal job). The last panel 
in table 4.5 records the share of PJH beneficiaries for each group. It is interesting to 
notice that only a small share of people who legally qualify to the program are actual 
beneficiaries, and that participation is higher for those individuals who do not legally 
qualify for the program (not unemployed not holding a formal job).  
As mentioned above, the incentives to look for a formal job substantially varied across 
the period under analysis. The cash transfer of the program was fixed in nominal terms 
($150), while the labor market recovered and wages in the formal sector substantially 
increased. While the PJH transfer represented 75% of the minimum wage in the formal 
sector in 2003, that share fell to just 24% in 2005.7  
In table 4.6 we show earnings in the formal sector, and labor income in part-time 
informal jobs.8 The column labeled Diff 1 reports the difference between earnings in a 
formal job and the PJH transfer, i.e. the gap relevant for the decision of a PJH 
participant not working in the market, or expecting to keep his current informal 
activities if hired in a formal job. That difference doubled between 2003 and 2005. If by 
working in the formal sector the worker had to abandon his activities in the informal 
sector, the difference reported in the last column would be more relevant. In this case 
the earnings gap more than doubled. The results suggest that the monetary incentives to 
look for a formal job greatly increased between 2003 and 2005. Many workers for 
whom leaving the PJH to get a formal job was not optimal in 2003 probably modified 
that decision in 2005. The distortion introduced by the unemployment requirement of 
the PJH might have been losing relevance over time.  
 
                                                 
6 Notice that showing that formal employment grew for non-participants but not for participants is not a 
sign of the informality bias of the program, since participants may be abandoning the program to become 
formal workers. 
7 The minimum wage was fixed at $200 from 1994 to the end of 2004 when it jumped to $450. In 2005 it 
scaled up to $630.  
8 The table displays wages at percentile 25, but results are robust to this choice. 
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5. Exploring the effect of the PJH on labor informality  
We apply non-experimental methods of impact evaluation to assess the labor 
informality bias of the PJH.9 The population is divided into two groups: those who 
receive the program (treated) and those who do not (non-treated). Let D be a binary 
variable that captures treatment, i.e. Di=1 if treated and Di=0 if not treated. Let Yik be the 
outcome to evaluate. In this paper we are interested in the type of the job (formal or 
informal). Hence, in most applications Y will be a binary variable equal to one if the 
worker has a formal job. Ideally, we would like to estimate the whole distribution of 
, where  is the outcome if the individual participates in the program 
and  is the outcome if (s)he does not participate. The problem of impact evaluation is 
that one of the two terms in G
C
i
T
ii YYG −= TiY
C
iY
i is unobservable. We just observe outcome Yi (Yi=  if 
D
T
iY
i=1 and Yi=  if DCiY i=0). In particular, in our case we observe the formal/informal 
decision of the PJH participants, but we do not know what that decision would have 
been if they had not received the program, i.e. the counterfactual outcomes for the 
participants.   
Given that estimating the whole distribution of Gi is very difficult, in most cases the 
analysis is restricted to estimate specific parameters. In particular, the vast majority of 
the impact evaluation literature is aimed at estimating the average treatment effect on 
the treated conditional on other covariates X  
ATET (Xi) = E(YiT- YiC \Xi, Di=1) 
A simple estimator of ATET is just the mean difference in outcomes between 
participants and the non-treated group (MDO). The general condition for zero bias is  
mean independence, also known as ignorability10  
                                                 E(Yk \D)= E(Yk)                                  k=T,C 
The best way to assure ignorability is to design a social experiment in which individuals 
are randomly assigned into the treatment and control group, so that both groups become 
statistically equivalent. The PJH was not designed as a social experiment. Participants 
were chosen according to certain rules, and in principle those meeting the requirements 
were entitled to the program. In practice, however, not all potential beneficiaries got the 
program. As shown in table 4.5 only a small share of those individuals legally in 
conditions of claiming the program, report being actual beneficiaries. One reason may 
                                                 
9 Ministerio de Trabajo (2004) does a rich characterization of those PJH beneficiaries that found formal 
jobs, based on a special survey, but the lack of a control group impedes them carrying out an impact 
evaluation exercise.   
10 See Lee (2005). 
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be due to the fact that some unemployed people were not poor, and although legally 
entitled to the program they understood the program was not intended for them. But 
even among the poor the take up rate is not large.  
There are many reasons why some people are participants and some not. Some of them 
are related to observable characteristics. To control for these factors we use matching 
techniques. But of course participants may differ from the rest in some unobservable 
dimensions. We control for some of these factors by using longitudinal data.  
Our strategy, given the available information, is simple. In a scenario of strong increase 
in the availability of formal jobs, we compare the proportion of PJH participants who 
find a formal job between t1 and t2 with that proportion for a group of non-participants 
with similar observable characteristics. To improve the matching we restrict the analysis 
to individuals who are not holding a formal job at time t1: almost all PJH participants 
are in that situation In that sense, although we are using panel data the first stage of the 
implicit diff-in-diff procedure is trivial, as the outcome variable (the share of formal 
workers) is zero for both treatment and control groups.     
The key assumption in this strategy is that in the absence of the program the PJH 
participants will be moving to the formal sector at the same rate as a matched group of 
non-participants. Of course, the assumption may be restrictive, as the factors affecting 
treatment may also affect the changes in the outcome (labor formality). See below for a 
discussion of this crucial point.  
Formally, we estimate    
     -1 22∑ ∑
∈ ∈ ⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
Ti Cj
C
jij
T
i
T i
YWY 
n
 ATET  
where nT is the size of the panel, T the set of treatment observations, Ci the set of control 
observations, and Wij the weight of observation j in the group of matches for participant 
i. Yi2T is a binary variable equal to 1 if individual i, who participated in the program in 
the first year of the panel, finds a formal job in the second year. Similarly, Yj2C is a 
binary variable equal to 1 if individual j, who did not participate in the program in the 
first year of the panel (and was not a formal worker), finds a formal job in the second 
year. 
The matching is carried out based on the propensity score, i.e. the probability of 
receiving treatment conditional on pre-treatment characteristics P(Zi). Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983) show that if the participation decisions are independent across individuals, 
and if outcomes Y are independent from actual participation given Zi, then outcomes are 
 13
independent from participation given P(Zi). This theorem allows carrying out the 
matching on scalars P(Zi) rather than in the multidimensional space of variables Z.11  
To improve the results we perform the matching over the propensity scores conditional 
on gender and income decile, i.e. matched observations should be similar in terms of the 
propensity score, and identical in terms of gender and income group.   
Exact matching on the P(Zi) is difficult as this is a continuous variable. The literature 
has proposed several schemes to weight observations with similar propensity scores. In 
this paper we use radius matching as the main weighting scheme, as it uses only good 
quality matches, and does not consider those treatment units who are very different 
from the comparisons units.12 We also use kernel and nearest neighbor methods to 
assess the robustness of the estimates. 
Summing up, the outcome Y of each participant i is compared to the weighted mean of a 
set of non-participants belonging to the same gender and income group, and whose 
propensity scores are “close” to that of participant i. To further improve the matching 
we restrict the analysis to adults aged 18 to 60 without a tertiary education, belonging to 
the bottom six deciles of the household income distribution, in the labor force, and 
without a formal job in the first year of the panel.13  
In table 5.1 we show the results of estimating a model of participation in the PJH for the 
sample mentioned above. The probit is estimated in the initial year using only the 
observations that belong to the panel. The results are similar to those in Galasso and 
Ravallion (2003), who estimate a somewhat similar model for the crisis period 2001-
2002. Women are more likely to be participants. The probability of participation is 
decreasing in the individual’s education (incomplete primary is the omitted category). 
Even when controlling for family size, the number of children under 18 affects 
participation. There are significant differences in participation across cities, even when 
controlling for other observable characteristics.   
Table 5.2 shows the differences in the mean values of a set of covariates between the 
treatment and the control group. Both groups seem pretty similar in terms of observable 
characteristics. None of the differences between groups are statistically significant in 
any of the two datasets considered.  
                                                 
11 See the Appendix for an explanation of this method. 
12 The radius used in the paper is 0.01.  
13 Galasso and Ravallion (2004) compare the group of PJH beneficiaries with those that have applied to 
the program but have not received it yet. This pipeline comparison allows them to construct a better 
counterfactual as applicants may be more similar to actual beneficiaries than non-applicants. 
Unfortunately, the EPH included the question on application to the PJH only during 2002, so we were not 
able to use that variable in our study. 
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The results of the propensity score matching analysis over the panels 2003-2004 and 
2004-2005 using the radius method are reported in table 5.3. Each column shows the 
share of formal workers in the second year of each panel for two groups: those who 
were PJH participants in the first year and those in the control group. As argued above 
the vast majority of participants are informal. We build the control group by restricting 
the choice to informal workers. Therefore, the outcome variable in year 1 is zero by 
definition in both treatment and control groups. The table shows the share of formal 
workers in the second year of the panel, when some former PJH participants and some 
former informal workers in the control group find a formal job.  
For each panel we report results for the whole sample, and then separately for men, 
females, those individuals whose incomes are between the moderate and the extreme 
poverty line, and those that are below the extreme line. In each column we report the 
mean value for the treated and the control groups, the difference, the standard error, the 
corresponding t value, and the number of treated observations.  
According to the first panel in table 5.3, 1.2% of all PJH participants in 2003 found a 
formal job one year later. The corresponding share for the control group was greater: 
4.6%. The difference is statistically significant and economically large. The gap in the 
jump into formality is substantially larger for males than for females and approximately 
the same for the extreme poor and the rest. Similar results arise when using the kernel 
and the nearest neighbor methods (see table A.1 in the Appendix).   
Results are qualitative similar in the panel 2004-2005 but quantitatively much weaker. 
While 3.9% of PJH participants moved from the program to a formal job, the 
corresponding figure for the control group was larger (5.7%) but not statistically 
different at 5%. In fact, the gap between participants and the control group vanishes in 
the case of males.14  
We interpret these results as preliminary evidence of the informality bias of the PJH in 
the early stage of the program, when the transfer was significant compared to wages in 
the formal sector. As the nominal value of the transfer remained fixed while the formal 
labor market strongly recovered, the gap shrunk, and hence the distortion became less 
important, and possibly negligible.    
A multivariate regression framework can provide results on the same issue based on a 
parametric model. Table 5.4 reports the results of a probit model for a dummy variable 
equals to 1 if the individual holds a formal job in year 2 of the panel. The model is run 
for the same sample discussed above. As right-hand-side variables we include program 
participation and a set of typical controls. The results in table 5.4 are similar than when 
                                                 
14 Some results even change signs when using other matching methods (see table A.1). 
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applying propensity score matching. In the early panel 2003-2004 all marginal effects 
are negative, and most of them statistically significant. In particular, the impact of the 
program on the informality decision of males seems large. In contrast, most effects 
vanish in the panel 2004-2005 when the relative value of the program subsidy collapses.  
Table 5.5 shows the results for the share of individuals in the labor force holding a 
genuine job, i.e. a job not related to the workfare program. PJH participants are less 
likely to have a genuine job. However, notice that in both panels the employment rate 
grew faster for the group of participants. The diff-in-diff estimator suggests that PJH 
participants in fact did better in terms of genuine employment than their non-participant 
counterparts. The results in table 5.5 do not support the view that the design of the PJH 
implied a bias against employment during the economic expansion.  
We have shown evidence suggesting that program participants moved into formal jobs 
at lower rates than non-participants with similar observable characteristics, at least in 
the early stage of the program when the gap between the transfer and earnings in the 
formal sector was not large. If the assignment into the program had been random, the 
results could be interpreted as the causal effect of the program on labor informality. 
However, as discussed above, the program was offered to everyone meeting certain 
conditions and then rationed by queues given the limited funds.  
One plausible reason why certain people got the program, while some others with 
similar observable characteristics did not, is having political and social contacts 
(sometimes also known as social capital) that facilitated the access to the information 
about the program and eased the application process (Giovagnoli, 2005; Ronconi et al., 
2005). As mentioned above, social organizations and NGOs had a key role in helping 
people to successfully apply to the program. On the other hand, the economic literature 
has stressed the positive impact of social capital on the access to the labor market.15 For 
instance, better political contacts could increase the probability of finding a formal job 
in the local public sector. If having more political and social contacts affects 
participation in the program and increases employability in the formal sector, then our 
results on the informality effect of the program will be downwardly biased. The results 
in table 5.3 would suggest that despite being in a better position to enter the formal 
labor market due to more social capital, PJH participants were more reluctant to accept 
formal offers, presumably because of the distortion introduced by the program.  
Another possibility is that participants were on average people with low preferences for 
a formal job, or with unobservable characteristics that make them less attractive for 
formal firms. If that were the case we should find that following the recovery of the 
                                                 
15 See Toledo (2006) for a recent study for Argentina on this issue.  
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labor market a relative low proportion of participants are hired in formal jobs, even in 
the absence of any distortion coming from the structure of the program. Notice, 
however, that in this case it is likely that there always exists a gap between participants 
and non-participants in their formal-job take-up rates. The evidence is not inconsistent 
with this fact in the case of women: in both panels while around 1.5% of female 
participants found a formal job, the corresponding figure for non-participants (matched) 
women is 4%. The hypothesis of PJH participants with low preferences or productivity 
in formal jobs (relative to their non-participants matched counterparts) is less consistent 
with the evidence in the case of males. Table 5.3 shows that when formal wages 
substantially increased, the rates of entry into the formal sector were similar for male 
participants and non-participants.  
A related alternative states that PJH participants are less likely to receive or less prone 
to accept any job offer (formal or informal), and hence the rate of entry into the formal 
labor market should be lower than for their non-participant counterparts. However, as 
the results in table 5.5 suggest, that does not seem the case: the employment rate of 
program participants (excluding work in the program) grew faster than the rate for non-
participants.   
Another possibility is that at the time of the program launching some people who 
qualified for the program had better perspectives of finding a formal job, and then they 
did not apply for the program. However, that fact may not affect our results since we 
start the analysis (due to data reasons) one year after the plan was implemented. Our 
control group is formed by people without a formal job in 2003. These workers would 
have found optimal to apply for the program since the cost of doing that was low, and 
their perspectives of finding a formal job were surely low in May 2002, given that one 
year later they are still in the informal sector.   
The geographical distribution of the program was not uniform. Some cities captured a 
disproportionate share of benefits, even when controlling for observable characteristics. 
Giovagnoli (2005) argues that areas with local authorities “closer” to the federal 
government were allowed to include proportionally more participants. Cities with a high 
share of PJH participants may be places where people were less prone to self-select out 
of the program. In particular, workers with unobservable characteristics that make them 
more productive, and hence with higher probability of quickly finding a job may have 
been more likely to apply and obtain the program in cities where the access to the PJH 
was easier. If that had been the case, when the economy recovered the jump from the 
program to formal employment should have been stronger in cities favored by the 
allocation of the PJH benefits. To provide some evidence on this issue we include in 
model 5.4 an interaction variable between the individual participation in the program 
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and the local share of PJH participants. The first column in table 5.6 shows the 
coefficients of this variable. The second column takes into account that the allocation of 
the PJH across geographical areas was likely determined by observable characteristics 
of the area, like the poverty and the unemployment rate. We then construct a second 
interaction variable between the individual participation in the program and the 
residuals of a model of PJH allocation at the city level. The main result is that the 
interaction effect is positive and significant for females, but not for males. Female 
participants seem to have been more likely to find a formal job in cities with high 
coverage of the program. 
 
6. Concluding remarks  
Although the Programa Jefes de Hogar is legally intended to the unemployed, in 
practice only those participants that accept a formal job face serious risks of losing the 
benefits. This feature of the program implies in theory a labor informality bias. By 
applying matching techniques we provide some evidence in favor of this hypothesis. 
During the period of economic expansion the number of formal jobs available in the 
economy increased. According to some estimations, the share of PJH participants that 
found a formal job was significantly lower than the corresponding share for non-
participants with similar observable characteristics. In some cases the difference is not 
only statistically significant, but economically large. For instance, when carrying out the 
propensity score matching with the radius method, in the period 2003-2004 the 
difference between PJH male participants and non-participants in the share of workers 
moving to a formal job is 5 points. The effect on informality vanishes in the period 
2004-2005 when the gap between the PJH transfer (fixed in nominal terms) and wages 
in the formal sector greatly widened.  
Although some evidence in the paper points out to the informality bias of the PJH, the 
results should be taken with care. As discussed above, the control group surely differs in 
some unobservable dimensions from the treatment group. If these factors also affect the 
probability of finding a formal job, the results could be biased.  
In summary, basic economic theory suggests an informality bias arising from the design 
of the PJH. With the information available (which is not enough to be conclusive), we 
find preliminary evidence that the prediction holds in practice, in periods when the 
difference between the value of the transfer and formal wages is small.  
The PJH was implemented under pressure. In 2002 Argentina faced a deep crisis, and 
poverty skyrocketed in a few months. In that context the government quickly 
implemented a program that helped alleviating the consequences of the economic crisis. 
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When the economic crisis was overcome, the program was maintained as an instrument 
for poverty reduction and income redistribution, with basically no changes in its design. 
While certain features of the program were not relevant in a period of high 
unemployment and falling incomes, they become relevant in a period of economic 
expansion. The results of this paper suggest that the design of the PJH might have 
slowed down the process of formalization of the program participants. This fact calls for 
a careful revision of the alternatives to avoid this unwanted bias in the future.   
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Appendix: propensity score matching  
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) defined the propensity score as the probability of 
receiving treatment conditional on pre-treatment characteristics: 
p(X)  Pr (D = 1 | X ) = E {D | X } ≡
At the same time they state two important propositions: 
Proposition 1: Balancing of pre-treatment variables given the propensity score 
If  p(X) is the propensity score then X ⊥ D |   p(X) 
If the balancing hypothesis is satisfied, individuals with the same propensity score must 
have the same distribution of observable characteristics independently of treatment 
status. In other words, for a given propensity score, exposure to treatment is random and 
therefore T and C units should be on average observationally identical. 
Proposition 2: Unconfoundedness given the propensity score 
Let p(X) be the probability of a unit i having been assigned to treatment then: 
T
iY ,  ⊥  D CiY  | X ⇒ ,  ⊥  D TiY CiY  | p(X) 
In words, if the exposure to treatment is random within cells defined by X, it is also 
random within cells defined by the values of the mono-dimensional variable p(X). 
As a result of these two propositions and if it is known the individual propensity score 
(p(Xi)), the ATET can be estimated as follows: 
ATET    E  ( - | D≡ TiY CiY i =1)  =  E {E ( - | DTiY CiY i =1, p(Xi))} 
 = Ep(X)   { E ( | DTiY i =1, p(Xi)) - E ( | DCiY i =1, p(Xi)) | Di = 1} 
 =  Ep(X)  { E ( | DTiY i =1, p(Xi)) - E ( | DCiY i = 0, p(Xi)) | Di = 1} 
Where the outer expectation is over the distribution of p(Xi) | Di = 1. 
This methodology is essentially a weighting scheme, which determines what weights 
are placed on comparison units when computing the estimated treatment effect.  
ATETE = ∑ ∑
∈ ∈ ⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
Ti Cj
C
jij
T
i
T i
YwY
N
1  
where NT: number of units in the treatment group and wij are the weights applied in 
calculating the counterfactual for each participant. 
Expectations are replaced by sample means, and we condition on p(Xi) by matching 
each T unit i to a set of comparison units C with similar propensity score. Taken 
literally. conditioning on p(Xi) implies exact matching on p(Xi). This is difficult in 
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practice since the probability of observing two units with exactly the same value of the 
propensity score is in principle zero since p(Xi) is a continuous variable. 
This restriction is relaxed in applied research and several methods have been proposed 
in the literature to overcome this problem. The question of how many C units to match 
with each T units is closely related to the issue between the precision of the estimate 
(less variance) and the bias. In this sense, a single C unit used for each T unit ensures 
the smallest propensity-score distance between C and T. More C unit used will reduce 
the variance but will increases the bias.  
The Nearest Neighbor consists of searching the m C units with the closest propensity 
score to each T unit. The Radius method uses all of the control units within a pre-
defined propensity-score radius. If the dimension of the radius is very small it is 
possible that some treated units are not matched because there are no control units in it. 
On the other hand, the smaller the size of the radius the better is the quality of the 
matches. With Kernel Matching all T are matched with a weighted average of all C with 
weights that are inversely proportional to the distance between the propensity-scores of 
treated and controls. 
In this paper we use these techniques of matching with replacement. This decision 
minimizes the propensity-score distance between the matched C units and the T unit: 
each T unit can be matched to the nearest C unit, even if a C unit is matched more than 
once. This is beneficial in terms of bias reduction but it is not in the precision of the 
estimates. At the same time, all estimations were done under the common support 
region. In other words, the values of the p(Xi) were overlapped across the C and T 
groups. 
This methodology identifies the impact of the program in expectation if there is no 
hidden bias or selection bias on unobservable, i.e, the condition for unbiasedness is that: 
E ( | DCiY i =1, p(Xi)) = E ( | DCiY i =0, p(Xi)) 
where the expectation is taken over the distribution of unobservables.  
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Table 4.1 
Share of households with PJH coverage  
By income quintiles
                                     Quintiles
1 2 3 4 5 Mea
2003-II 31.6 23.1 9.9 4.4 0.6 11.6
2004-I 32.4 22.4 9.9 3.2 0.6 11.4
2004-II 33.6 20.9 8.4 3.2 0.7 11.0
2005-I 33.5 19.2 7.8 2.4 0.6 10.4
2005-II 30.3 16.6 5.8 2.5 0.3 9.0
By education of the household head
Low Medium High Mean
2003-II 17.1 8.9 2.2 10.9
2004-I 16.4 9.6 1.8 10.8
2004-II 16.3 7.9 1.4 10.3
2005-I 15.5 7.0 1.4 9.6
2005-II 14.4 7.1 1.0 9.0
n
 
Source: own calculations based on the EPHC. 
Note: Low: primary incomplete 
Medium: secondary complete 
High: tertiary or college complete  
 
 
Table 4.2 
Distribution of PJH beneficiaries  
By equivalized income quintiles 
Households
1 2 3 4 5 Tota
2003-II 41.4 32.0 16.7 8.6 1.3 100.0
2004-I 42.8 32.2 17.5 6.3 1.3 100.0
2004-II 45.3 31.5 15.0 6.5 1.7 100.0
2005-I 47.8 30.3 15.3 5.2 1.5 100.0
2005-II 49.2 30.6 13.0 6.2 1.0 100.0
Individuals
1 2 3 4 5 Tota
2003-II 40.8 33.2 16.2 8.5 1.2 100.0
2004-I 42.1 33.3 17.1 6.2 1.2 100.0
2004-II 45.2 31.7 14.9 6.6 1.6 100.0
2005-I 48.3 30.0 15.1 5.4 1.4 100.0
2005-II 49.1 31.3 12.6 6.1 1.0 100.0
l
l
 
Source: own calculations based on the EPHC 
 
Table 4.3 
Share of PJH participants in population and employment  
2003-II 2004-I 2004-II 2005-I 2005-II
Adults aged 18 to 60
   Share in population 6.2 6.0 5.6 5.3 4.9
   Share in employment 8.7 8.1 7.5 6.7 5.8
Sample: Adults aged 18 to 60, deciles 1 to 6, without tertiary education
   All
     Share in population 12.9 12.6 11.4 11.5 10.1
     Share in employment 19.9 18.9 16.6 15.7 13.0
   Males
     Share in population 8.8 7.6 6.8 6.4 5.0
     Share in employment 11.3 9.5 8.2 7.7 5.6
   Females
     Share in population 16.7 17.0 15.7 16.1 14.8
     Share in employment 33.7 33.4 30.3 29.1 25.7  
Source: own calculations based on the EPHC.  
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Table 4.4 
Labor status  
Adults in deciles 1 to 6 without tertiary education 
2003-II 2004-I 2004-II 2005-I 2005-II
All
   Employed - formal 12.9 13.4 14.2 14.2 15.5
   Employed - informal 44.6 44.8 45.2 44.4 44.4
   Unemployed 15.1 14.6 12.9 11.9 10.7
   Inactive 27.4 27.1 27.6 29.5 29.4
Non-participants
   Employed - formal 14.7 15.3 16.0 16.0 17.2
   Employed - informal 38.0 38.7 39.9 39.8 40.7
   Unemployed 17.1 16.4 14.2 13.1 11.5
   Inactive 30.2 29.6 29.9 31.2 30.7
Participants
   Employed - formal 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.6
   Employed - informal 88.8 87.5 86.7 80.1 77.2
   Unemployed 2.1 2.1 3.0 3.4 4.2
   Inactive 8.5 9.9 9.7 16.1 18.0  
Source: own calculations based on the EPHC.  
 
Table 4.5 
Share of participants by group  
With a Share of participants - 2003-II
Head With children Unemployed formal job Qualifies 1 Qualifies 2 All Sample Males Females
yes yes yes no yes yes 0.02 0.03 0.04 .
no yes yes no no yes 0.02 0.04 . 0.04
yes no yes no no no 0.01 0.03 . .
no no yes no no no 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
yes yes no no no yes 0.18 0.26 0.19 0.40
no yes no no no yes 0.13 0.21 0.10 0.21
yes no no no no no 0.03 0.08 0.09 0.08
no no no no no no 0.05 0.10 0.08 0.12
yes yes no yes no no 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
no yes no yes no no 0.00 0.01 . 0.01
yes no no yes no no 0.00 0.00 0.00 .
no no no yes no no 0.00 0.01 0.02 .  
Source: own calculations based on the EPHC.  
Note1 : We do not report results for cells with less than 100 observations.  
All = adults aged 18 to 60.  
Sample= adults with no tertiary education belonging to deciles 1 to 6. 
Males and females restricted to this sample.  
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Table 4.6 
Earnings and PJH transfers 
 Adults in deciles 1 to 6 without tertiary education 
Values at percentile 25 
PJH transfer Formal wage Informal wage Diff 1 Diff 2
(i) (ii) (iii) (ii)-(i) (ii)-(i)-(iii)
All
   2003-II 150 366 120 216 96
   2004-I 150 397 149 247 98
   2004-II 150 445 149 295 145
   2005-I 150 502 155 352 198
   2005-II 150 565 180 415 235
Males
   2003-II 150 398 150 248 98
   2004-I 150 417 197 267 69
   2004-II 150 485 199 335 135
   2005-I 150 515 206 365 159
   2005-II 150 595 242 445 203
Females
   2003-II 150 295 99 145 46
   2004-I 150 305 100 155 55
   2004-II 150 352 101 202 102
   2005-I 150 402 121 252 131
   2005-II 150 406 121 256 135  
Source: own calculations based on the EPHC.  
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Table 5.1 
Probit models for calibrating the propensity scores 
Dependent variable: PJH participants 
Data from 2003-2004 panel Data from 2004-2005 panel
Coef. Std.Err z P>|z| Coef. Std.Err z P>|z|
age 0.026 0.04 0.7 0.472 -0.002 0.03 -0.1 0.944
age squared 0.000 0.00 -1.0 0.345 0.000 0.00 0.0 0.985
Male -1.371 0.12 -11.9 0.000 -1.167 0.10 -12.1 0.000
Head -0.153 0.25 -0.6 0.539 0.123 0.20 0.6 0.538
Spouse -0.762 0.28 -2.7 0.006 -0.442 0.23 -1.9 0.053
Married 0.592 0.13 4.5 0.000 0.117 0.11 1.1 0.286
Complete primary -0.214 0.11 -1.9 0.060 -0.178 0.11 -1.6 0.105
Incomplete secondary -0.165 0.12 -1.4 0.175 -0.266 0.12 -2.3 0.022
Complete secondary -0.351 0.14 -2.6 0.011 -0.343 0.13 -2.7 0.007
Hosehold size 0.026 0.02 1.4 0.156 0.017 0.02 1.0 0.326
Children under 18 0.625 0.22 2.9 0.004 0.518 0.17 3.1 0.002
Per capita income -0.001 0.00 -0.6 0.534 -0.003 0.00 -3.6 0.000
Unemployed -1.712 0.17 -10.2 0.000 -1.675 0.17 -10.0 0.000
City dummies Yes Yes
Observations 1951 2113
Pseudo R2 0.265 0.244  
Source: own calculations based on the EPH.  
 
 
Table 5.2 
Difference in means: treatment and control group  
Data from 2003-2004 panel Data from 2004-2005 panel
Control Treatment Diff. t Control Treatment Diff. t
age 34.10 33.92 0.18 0.72 34.89 34.77 0.13 0.78
Male 0.31 0.31 0.00 1.00 0.27 0.27 0.00 1.00
Head 0.42 0.46 -0.04 0.11 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.88
Spouse 0.38 0.37 0.01 0.71 0.31 0.31 0.00 0.95
Married 0.71 0.70 0.00 0.85 0.61 0.61 -0.01 0.73
Incomplete primary 0.13 0.14 -0.01 0.68 0.16 0.16 0.01 0.69
Complete primary 0.42 0.40 0.02 0.45 0.40 0.41 -0.01 0.73
Incomplete secondary 0.30 0.32 -0.02 0.54 0.26 0.27 0.00 0.90
Complete secondary 0.15 0.15 0.00 0.87 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.83
Hosehold size 5.70 5.56 0.14 0.27 5.56 5.48 0.08 0.50
Children under 18 0.78 0.81 -0.03 0.23 0.76 0.78 -0.02 0.44
Per capita income 77.98 78.25 -0.27 0.89 89.37 90.76 -1.39 0.56
Employed 0.99 0.99 0.00 0.71 0.98 0.98 0.00 0.84
Unemployed 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.71 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.84  
Source: own calculations based on the EPH.  
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Table 5.3 
Share of individuals with a formal job in year 2 
Average treatment effect on the treated using propensity score matching 
Radius method 
Panels 2003-2004 and 2004-2005 
Group of adults aged 18 to 60, in the labor force, from deciles 1 to 6, without a formal job in year 1 
 
2003-2004-II
All Males Females Moderate Extreme
poor poor
Treated 0.012 0.011 0.013 0.021 0.004
Control 0.046 0.061 0.039 0.056 0.038
Difference -0.034 -0.050 -0.026 -0.035 -0.034
Std.Err. 0.012 0.015 0.012 0.022 0.014
t -2.888 -3.351 -2.114 -1.632 -2.377
Observations 562 184 378 241 242
2004-2005-II
All Males Females Moderate Extreme
poor poor
Treated 0.039 0.091 0.019 0.037 0.041
Control 0.057 0.095 0.041 0.048 0.057
Difference -0.017 -0.004 -0.022 -0.011 -0.016
Std.Err. 0.014 0.026 0.013 0.022 0.024
t -1.207 -0.148 -1.660 -0.495 -0.670
Observations 585 164 421 244 220  
Source: own calculations based on the EPH.  
 
Table 5.4 
Model of the share of individuals with a formal job in year 2 
Marginal effect of the PJH participation 
Panels 2003-2004 and 2004-2005 
Group of adults aged 18 to 60, in the labor force, from deciles 1 to 6, without a formal job in year 1 
 
 
2003-2004-II
All Males Females Moderate Extreme
poor poor
Marginal effect -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04
Coefficient -0.49 -0.90 -0.34 -0.44 -0.91
Std. Error 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
z -3.30 -3.86 -1.46 -1.83 -3.19
Observations 2841 1511 944 1197 657
2004-2005-II
All Males Females Moderate Extreme
poor poor
Marginal effect -0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01
Coefficient -0.10 0.10 -0.34 -0.14 -0.17
Std. Error 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02
z -0.87 0.75 -1.77 -0.64 -0.72
Observations 3226 1663 1256 1348 772  
Source: own calculations based on the EPH.  
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 Table 5.5 
Share of individuals with a non-PJH job 
Propensity score matching 
Radius method 
Panel 2003-2004 and 2004-2005 
Group of adults aged 18 to 60, in the labor force, from deciles 1 to 6, without a formal job in year 1 
 
2003-2004
All Males Females Moderate Extreme
poor poor
Year 1
Treated 0.216 0.325 0.169 0.255 0.151
Control 0.478 0.780 0.350 0.471 0.467
Difference -0.263 -0.455 -0.181 -0.216 -0.316
Std.Err. 0.020 0.037 0.023 0.032 0.029
t -12.875 -12.143 -7.833 -6.738 -11.007
Observations 667 200 467 294 298
Year 2
Treated 0.340 0.568 0.244 0.350 0.322
Control 0.529 0.811 0.409 0.534 0.519
Difference -0.188 -0.244 -0.165 -0.183 -0.197
Std.Err. 0.022 0.039 0.025 0.034 0.034
t -8.448 -6.274 -6.545 -5.409 -5.839
Observations 667 199 468 294 298
Changes
Treated 0.124 0.243 0.074 0.095 0.171
Control 0.050 0.031 0.059 0.063 0.052
Diff-in-diff 0.074 0.211 0.015 0.033 0.120
2004-2005
All Males Females Moderate Extreme
poor poor
Year 1
Treated 0.246 0.475 0.166 0.279 0.170
Control 0.500 0.780 0.401 0.542 0.433
Difference -0.254 -0.305 -0.235 -0.263 -0.263
Std.Err. 0.021 0.040 0.024 0.033 0.035
t -11.908 -7.547 -9.957 -7.989 -7.626
Observations 686 179 507 305 259
Year 2
Treated 0.392 0.659 0.298 0.416 0.351
Control 0.532 0.847 0.421 0.564 0.483
Difference -0.140 -0.188 -0.123 -0.148 -0.132
Std.Err. 0.023 0.038 0.027 0.035 0.039
t -6.107 -4.930 -4.620 -4.249 -3.370
Observations 686 179 507 305 259
Changes
Treated 0.146 0.184 0.132 0.138 0.181
Control 0.032 0.067 0.020 0.022 0.050
Diff-in-diff 0.114 0.117 0.112 0.115 0.131  
Source: own calculations based on the EPH.  
 
Table 5.6 
Model of the share of individuals with a formal job in year 2 
Marginal effect of interaction variable (individual PJH participation*intensity of the PJH in city) 
Intensity defined as (i) share of PJH participants and (ii) residuals from a participation regression 
              Interaction term
share residuals
2003-2004
   All 0.1321 -0.0029
   Males 0.4690 0.5487
   Females 0.1324*** 0.0912
2004-2005
   All 0.3794*** 0.4997***
   Males 0.0602 -0.0705
   Females 0.1407*** 0.1806***  
Source: own calculations based on the EPH. 
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Table A.1 
Share of individuals with a formal job in year 2 
Average treatment effect on the treated using propensity score matching 
Nearest neighbor and kernel methods 
Group of adults aged 18 to 60, in the labor force, from deciles 1 to 6, without a formal job in year 1 
 
Panel 2003-2004-II 
Kernels
All Males Females Moderate Extreme
poor poor
Treated 0.014 0.010 0.016 0.021 0.007
Control 0.043 0.068 0.030 0.050 0.034
Difference -0.029 -0.058 -0.015 -0.029 -0.027
Observations 633 195 438 285 284
Nearest neighbor
All Males Females Moderate Extreme
poor poor
Treated 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.021 0.008
Control 0.035 0.066 0.027 0.058 0.033
Difference -0.024 -0.054 -0.016 -0.038 -0.024
Std.Err. 0.011 0.023 0.011 0.024 0.016
t -2.187 -2.389 -1.523 -1.571 -1.501
Observations 633 195 438 285 284  
 
Panel 2004-2005-II 
Kernels
All Males Females Moderate Extreme
poor poor
Treated 0.048 0.104 0.028 0.045 0.036
Control 0.053 0.089 0.040 0.045 0.051
Difference -0.005 0.015 -0.012 0.000 -0.015
Observations 641 173 468 291 248
Nearest neighbor
All Males Females Moderate Extreme
poor poor
Treated 0.042 0.093 0.024 0.046 0.038
Control 0.062 0.053 0.054 0.019 0.068
Difference -0.020 0.040 -0.031 0.028 -0.030
Std.Err. 0.016 0.030 0.017 0.020 0.029
t -1.245 1.324 -1.804 1.398 -1.023
Observations 641 173 468 291 248  
Source: own calculations based on the EPH.  
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Table A.2 
Share of individuals with a formal job in year 2 
Average treatment effect on the treated using propensity score matching 
Group of adults aged 18 to 60, in the labor force, from deciles 1 to 6, without a formal job in year 1 
Aggregate panels 2003-2005 
 
radio
All Males Females Moderate Extreme
poor poor
Treated 0.035 0.062 0.023 0.037 0.022
Control 0.051 0.086 0.036 0.046 0.046
Difference -0.016 -0.024 -0.013 -0.009 -0.024
Std.Err. 0.007 0.012 0.007 0.012 0.010
t -2.239 -1.991 -1.678 -0.773 -2.464
Observations 1849 566 1283 815 766
Nearest neighbor
All Males Females Moderate Extreme
poor poor
Treated 0.034 0.058 0.021 0.037 0.022
Control 0.047 0.072 0.031 0.041 0.045
Difference -0.012 -0.013 -0.010 -0.004 -0.023
Std.Err. 0.009 0.016 0.009 0.014 0.013
t -1.371 -0.809 -1.090 -0.273 -1.749
Observations 1890 574 1316 853 792
Kernels
All Males Females Moderate Extreme
poor poor
Treated 0.024 0.039 0.019 0.031 0.019
Control 0.048 0.082 0.034 0.047 0.044
Difference -0.023 -0.044 -0.015 -0.017 -0.026
Observations 1572 429 1143 758 782  
Source: own calculations based on the EPH.  
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